Estates in North Dakota by Meschke, Herbert L.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 4 Article 1 
1954 
Estates in North Dakota 
Herbert L. Meschke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Meschke, Herbert L. (1954) "Estates in North Dakota," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 30 : No. 4 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol30/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
ESTATES IN NORTH DAKOTA
HERBERT L. MESCHKE*
INTRODUCTION
S OUR machinery of estates still functional? Should we tear it
down and rebuild it or should we continue to operate it in its
present form? If the latter, what overhauls and repairs should be
made?
The fact that England has already made a major overhaul of
its estate law' provokes the questions raised above. The English
seem to have recognized that basically their old machinery of
estates operated on two different "fuels", which did not always
mix to obtain the desired smoothness of performance. These "fuels",
as they might be described, are the two fundamental policy con-
siderations upon which the law of property is shaped - that of
effectuating the transferor's intent and that of obtaining the
greatest freedom of alienability, for commercial reasons.2  Ap-
parently the English have kept the old machinery of estates, but
have designed it to operate on a mixture of "fuel" richer with the.
policy of free alienability.3
This paper attempts a partial examination of the law of estate
in North Dakota, with an eye to needed repairs and to manifesta-
tions that suggest overhaul or rebuilding. It is the writer's inten-
tion to confine the subject, in so far as possible, within the basic
area of estates and to leave the area of future interests to more
expert mechanics.
SOURCE OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CODE
The background of North Dakota legislation dealing with the
law of estates should first be noted. The primary source of North
Dakota statute law in this area is the Field Civil Code, promul-
gated for New York in 1865, but never adopted in that state.4 How-
*Member, North Dakota Bar.
1. Law of Property Act of 125, (15 Geo. V., c. 20); Settled Land Act of 1925
(15 Geo. V., c. 18). There are other acts of the same year which round out this revision:
The Trustees Act of 1925; The Land Charges Act of 1925; The Administration of Estates
Act of 1925; and the Land Registration Act of 1925.
2. Lawson, The Rational Strength of English Law 81 et seq. (1951).
3. For comment on the English legislation, see Bordwell, English Property Reform and
its American Aspects, 37 Yale L. J. 1, 179 (1927); Bordwell, Property Reform in England,
Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1925); Johnson, The Reform of Property Law in England, 25 Col. L. Rev.
609 (1925); Withers, Property Legislation of 1925-Twenty Years Experience, 62 L. Q.
Rev. 167 (1946).
4. The Civil Code of the State of New York Reported Complete by the Commissioners
of the Code (1865).
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ever, the territorial legislature of the Territory of Dakota adopted
it in the year of its appearance5 and it has been carried forward, in
substantially the same form, into the Codes of North and South
Dakota. 6 Four other states have likewise drawn on the Field Civil
Code, either directly or from one of the states that had already
adopted it - California, Montana, Idaho, and Oklahoma.
7
In the area of estates, the Field Code appears to be largely
grounded on New York legislation of 18288 which purported to
codify and simplify the common law of estates, enacting some
specific reforms which were thought particularly desirable even
then. This New York legislation has also been reflected in legisla-
tion in at least six other jurisdictions - Indiana, Michigan, Wis-
consin, Arizona, Minnesota, and the District of Columbia.9
WHAT NORTH DAKOTA HAS
Derived as it is from the 1828 New York legislation, the North
Dakota Code has many of the desirable variations from the old
common law of property. Thus, the necessity of words of inheri-
tance or succession in a transfer has been eliminated. 10 A transfer
is presumed to pass all the transferor's interest unless a different
intention is expressed." A transfer by the grantor to himself and
another in joint tenancy is made effective. 2 Conveyances by mar-
ried women 13 and between husband wife are validated.14  The
Rule in Shelley's case has been abrogated.14 The doctrine of de-
structibility of contingent remainders has been eliminated. 6 There
are a number of other improvements, some of which will be noted
hereinafter.
WHAT NORTH DAKOTA SHOULD HAVE
It is the writer's belief that North Dakota should adopt the
Uniform Property Act.17 While some of the reforms embodied in
that Act appear to be more or less adequately dealt with by existing
5. Dak. Sess. L. (1865).
6. N.D. Rev. Code (1943), Vol. 1, p. 6 of preface.
7. For an outline of the adoption of this legislation, see I Am. L. Prop. 66 (1952).
8. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the Statute Law of the State
of New York, (1826-28), Part II.
9. See note 7, supra.
10. N.D. Rev. Code §§ 47-0915 (transfers, 56-0513 (devises).
11. Ibid, § 47-0916 (transfers), § 56-0606 (devises). See also § 47-1013 (Grant pre-
sumed to pass fee simple title).
12. Ibid, § 47-0203.
13. Id. § 14-0705.
14. Id. § 14-0706.
15. Id. § 47-0420.
16. Id. § § 47-0230, 47-0232.
17. 9a Uniform Laws Annotated 251-257.
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provisions in the Code,18 many other mouldy rules of property
would be eliminated, and those already dealt with would be
handled by more succinct and thorough language.
"The Act is drawn primarily to abolish anachronisms in the law
of property, to abolish many out-of-date characteristics which have
come down to us from the early feudal law of England and which
are out of place in the law of today, and also to correct many
characteristics which have crept into the law from improper appli-
cation of the early law and which can be got rid of today only
by statutory enactment. But the Act also contains some changes
in the law which in the opinion of experts should be adopted to
improve the law's usefulness to society."'
The Act was the joint product of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law In-
stitute; 0 it has been adopted in Nebraska; 2' and it has been recom-
mended for adoption in other states by a number of wrters.
-22
Some of the problems dealt with in the Act will be specifically
referred to hereinafter.
ASSIMILATING INTERESTS IN REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY
While "It]his is in accord with what the courts have been
doing by judicial decisions during the last generation,"'2' it is par-
ticularly desirable that section 3 of the Uniform Property Act be
adopted. It provides that interests which may be created with
regard to land may be created also with regard to personal prop-
erty, when the parties in interest desire to do so.
2
1
As it has been pointed out by another writer,2 5 however, this
provision does not state that the rules applicable to the various in-
terests in real property apply to personal property; nor does it state
that the creation of interests in real and personil property is to be
18. See notes 10-16, supra.
19. 9a Uniform Laws Annotated 249 (Commissioner's Prefatory Note).
20. Ibid.
21. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-101 to 76-123 (1943).
22. O'Connell, A Property Act for Oregon, 30 Ore. L. Rev. 1 (1950); English, The
Uniform Property Act in Pennsylvania, 46 Dick L. Rev. 26, 144, 211 (1942); Myerberg,
Maryland Examines the Proposed Uniform Property Act, 4 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1939).
23. 9a Uniform Laws Annotated 249 (Commissioner's Prefatory Note). See Simes,
Historical Development of Future Interests in Things Other Than Land, in 1 Am. L. Prop.
411-15 (1952). In First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 66 N.D. 160, 262 N.W. 596
(1935), it was recognized that a brother and sister could hold a bank deposit as tenants in
common or as joint tenants.
24. Uniform Property Act § 3: "Any possessory or future interest, power of appointment
or of revocation, which can be created in this State with regard to land, can also be created
with regard to anything other than land, including choses in action."
25. O'ConnelU, A Property Act for Oregon, 30 Ore L. Rev. 1, 5 (1950).
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governed by the same rules. In short, it does not foreclose con-
sideration of the inherent differences between personal and real
property.
At the present time, the Code appears only to provide for
estates in real property.
2 6
STATUS OF THE FEE TAIL
In North Dakota, the fee tail isn't; it is a fee simple,7 subject
to a contingent limitation upon the death of the first taker, without
issue living at the time of his death.28  The writer has no quarrel
with this result, since estates tail do not seem to be much in de-
mand.
2 9
THE DETERMINABLE FEE AND THE FEE ON
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT
Recognition of the determinable fee and of the fee on condi-
tion subsequent (sometimes referred to as a fee simple subject to a
power of termination) seems implicit in the statutory definition of
a fee simple:
"Every estate of inheritance is a fee, and every such
estate, when not defeasible or conditional, is a fee simple
or an absolute fee."0° [emphasis supplied]
Another Code section appears to state the common law rules
concerning transfer"l and release 12 of the future estate, right of re-
entry for condition broken, also known as a power of termination,
which correlates to the fee on condition subsequent:
"Property of any kind may be transferred except:
(1) A mere possibility not coupled with an interest;
(2) A mere right of reentry or of possession for
breach of a condition subsequent which cannot
be transferred to anyone except the owner of the
property affected thereby."' -
While the language of this provision, in terms, does not appear
to be applicable to the possibility of reverter, which is the future
estate that correlates to the determinable fee, it may have been so
applied by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in the only case in
26. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0402 (1943): "Estates in real property in respect to the
duration of their enjoyment are
27. Ibid. § 47-0405.
28. Id. § 47-0406.
29. 1 Restatement, Property c. 5, Introductory Note (1936).
30. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0404 (1943).
31. 2 Restatement, Property § 160 (1936).
32. Id. § 161.
33. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0902 (1943).
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North or South Dakota that has dealt with identically worded pro-
visions.
In that case, Rowbotham v. Jackson,3 4 Carr, owner of lots 11
and 12, conveyed lot 11 to defendant Jackson. The deed recited
certain building "stipulations" and contained the following clause:
"If these restrictions be in anyway violated, or not fully
complied with in the event of any building being placed
on said lot, then all right and title shall revert to the grant-
ors without process of law;"
By mesne conveyances, all of which contained a provision that
"the grantors also convey . . . certain rights, reserved to said
grantor under the building restriction on lot number 11," title to
lot 12 was conveyed to plaintiff. Subsequently, the heirs of Carr,
after his death quitclaimed their interest in lot 11 to defendant.
The quitclaim deeds contained the following clause:
"And releasing and making null and void the reverting
clause in Warranty Deed to John A. Jackson" . . .
Plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant from moving a building on lot
11 which would violate the building restrictions. The trial court
granted the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed.
The court held that the clause in the original deed was not a
covenant, but rather a "reverter clause" with "reverter language."
They went on to say that "[ilt seems to partake of the nature of
a condition subsequent and not in the nature of a covenant." [em-
phasis supplied]. After thus holding that plaintiff had no interest
in the nature of a covenant running with his land on which to base
an injunction, the court went on to hold that this "reverter" interest
had not been conveyed to him, relying on the South Dakota section
which is identical in language with subsection (2) of §47-0902
quoted supra.
If the court meant to say that a right of re-entry for condition
broken, also known as a power of termination, cannot be conveyed,
it is undoubtedly in accord with the weight of authority even absent
statute.35 If, however, the court meant to say that possibility of
reverter cannot be conveyed, the holding conflicts with the weight
of authority, although the matter is not entirely free from doubt.36
The court did not indicate clearly into which category it meant to
34. 68 S.D. 566, 5 N.W.2d 36 (1942).
35. See note 31, supra. However, in some states a power of termination is made
transferable by statute. See 2 Restatement, Property § 160, comment d, (1936), for citation
of these statutes.
36. 2 Restatement, Property § 159 (1936); Collette v. Town of Charlotte, 114 Vt. 357,
45 A.2d 203 (1946); 45 Mich. L. Rev. 375 (1947).
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classify the "reverter" interest, but stated simply that, "[T] his
language, we construe to fall within the above statutory language
to 'reentry or of repossession' . . ." It is submitted, however,
that the language of the so-called "reverter" clause is more apt to
a possibility of reverter, than a right of re-entry for condition
broken,3 7 and it would therefore appear that the statute was ap-
plied to a possibility of reverter.
Moreover, in appraising this decision, it should be pointed out
that even if it had been held that the "reverter" interest had been
conveyed to plaintiff, it would probably not have entitled him to
an injunction because it could hardly be contended that the holder
of either a possibility of reverter or a power of termination may
enjoin the very act upon which his future estate is conditioned, al-
though the holder of such an interest might sometimes be entitled
to enjoin waste under proper circumstances. 8
THE LIFE ESTATE
The life estate appears to be highly useful in dividing prop-
erty among the family. Its duration correlates with the needs of
those for whom immediate provision is desired to be made by one
settling his property among his family. But the flexibility it allows
in family planning is offset to a great extent by the complications
presented by its relationship to the succeeding interests and by the
uncertainty inherent in its duration.
A. Sale
The fact that it is of uncertain duration means that a life estate
has relatively no marketability, for any investment in a life estate
necessarily involves a gamble on the length of the measuring life.
However, the unmarketability of the life estate as an entire interest
does not seem to call for repair, if indeed it would be possible, for
it may be supposed that the creator rarely contemplates that the
life tenant should market it. Too, in an extreme situation, there is
the saving equitable doctrine which empowers a court of equity to
order a sale of property subject to present and future interests and
establish a trust of the proceeds, subject to the same interests, if it
is "necessary" to preserve the interests . 9  This doctrine has been
37. Compare 1 Restatement, Property § 44, comment 1 and § 45, comment j, (1936).
38. Restatement, Property § 193 (1936); Pavkovich v. So. Pac. Ry., 150 Cal. 39, 87
Pac. 1097 (1906).
39. The doctrine has the support of the weight of authority. Beliveau v. Beliveau,
217 Minn. 225, 14 N.W.2d 360 (1944); Restatement, Property, c. 11, topic 2 (1936);
Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other Interests by Judicial
Process, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 30 (1928); 3 Simes, Future Interests c. 51 (1936).
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recognized in North Dakota by Rasmusson v. Schmalenberge4 0
which sustained such a court order on collateral attack. While the
court uses languagd approving the doctrine, it is not as square a
decision as might be desired because the court did not directly pass
on the doctrine. Therefore, it is suggested that a statutory pro-
vision might well be enacted which leaves no doubt about the
matter.4
B. Realizing an Income from a Life Estate
No particular problem is raised if the property held for life is
a home for the benefit of the life tenant or a beneficial interest in a
trust providing a life income. But when it is a legal life estate
intended to provide a life income, this uncertainty is frustrating,
not only to the creator's intentions but also to public policy, if the
property can only be made productive through its commercial use
by other than the life tenant. As a practical matter, such property
cannot be remuneratively leased to someone capable of making it
productive, because of the discouraging fact that a lease by a life
tenant terminates with his death.42  The life tenant cannot let what
he does not have.
Thus, for example, if a testator, inadvertently or otherwise,
gives his surviving spouse a legal life estate in business property,
such as an office building, apartment house, or farm, 43 it is likely
that the income on which the spouse is now dependent is not going
to fulfill the testator's expectations. Moreover, the full economic
utility of the property to society may not be realized.
Of course a method is open to testators by which this could be
.voided- a trust of the property with life income to the wife.
Thus it might be reasoned that no remedy is called for, since an
adequately advised testator will avoid this situation. But there
remains the testator who is not adequately advised, or for some
other reason desires to use the legal life estate. And the trust de-
vice reduces the income by the cost of trust management.
Or the life-tenant could insure the lessee by giving a bond,
but this is costly and not altogether satisfactory to lessees. 44
40. 60 N.D. 527, 235 N.W. 496 (1931).
41. See, for example, Dist. of Col. Code § 45-1104 (1951); Restatement, Property
124, comment i (1936), for a citation of such statutes. See further in this connection
Restatement, Property j 179, Note on Statutory Sale for Reinvestment.
42. Restatement, Property § 124 (1936).
43. Perhaps a legal life estate in farming property is the likeliest solution in North Da-
kota. It is, of course, recognized that in this situation the problem posed above is minimized
by the doctrine of emblements, which will save to the lessee from the life tenant the fruits
of his farming effort, even though the life tenant dies before the crop is harvested. Re-
statement, Property § 121, comment b (1936).
44. Haywood v. Briggs, 227 N.C. 108, 41 S.E.2d 289 (1947).
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If, then, we are to retain the legal life estate, why not give it
a measure of certainty, thus avoiding the "can't-lease-beyond-his-
life" problem and making the life estate more useful -if this can
be done without imposing too much on the remainder.
It is believed that the following proposed statute, or some-
thing similar, would be a possible solution. While giving the life
tenant qualified power to lease beyond his life, and thus the power
to guarantee some certainty to the lessee, and to do so without ex-
pense, it substantially preserves the remainderman's interest by
giving him the rent after the death of the life tenant and restricting
the maximum term for which the life tenant can bind the remain-
derman.
"Unless otherwise stated in the instrument creating the life-
estate, the owner or owners of an estate for life, which is here-
after created, shall have the power to execute a lease for a
reasonable term, not exceeding three years, which shall bind
and be enforceable against the remainderman or remainder-
men, if the person by whose life the estate is measured dies
during the term of the lease..
"No such lease, or any renewal thereof, shall be effective if
it is executed more than ninety days from the time it is to take
effect.
"Such lease shall be ineffective to bind the remainderman or
remaindermen if it is made for a nominal rental, which bears
no relation to the reasonable rental value.
"From and after the death of the person by whose life the
estate is measured, the lessee under a lease made pursuant to
this section, and the remainderman or remaindermen shall
stand in the relation of lessee and lessor for the remainder of
the term.
"Upon the death of the person by whose life the estate is
measured, the rent, whether paid in advance or payable at the
end of any term, shall be apportioned ratably between the life
estate and the remainder.
"If after the death of the person by whose life the estate is
measured, rent becomes payable which is apportionable to a
period before the death of such person, then it is the duty of
the lessee to pay such portion to the holder of the previous
life-estate, or to his probate estate.
"The holder of the life estate or his probate estate, shall be
liable to the remainderman or remaindermen for rent paid in
advance which is in fact apportionable to a period after the
death of the person by whose life the estate is measured."
C. Other Leasing Problems
The foregoing proposal shadows another problem. While the
Code provides that a lessee is liable for a proportionate part of the
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rent where his lease is terminated prior to its term by the death of
the life tenant,4' no provision is found apportioning the rent be-
tween the life estate and remainder where the lease continues after
the death of the life tenant, as where it is made by the grantor of
the life estate, prior to creation of the life estate.4" It is recom-
mended that a provision be enacted making the rent apportionable
in such a case."
D. Protecting the Future Interests
Let us turn now to the second large problem in connection
with life estates -relation of the life tenant to the remainderman.
The Code provides:41s
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint tenant, or ten-
ant in common, of real property, commits waste thereon, any
person aggreived by the waste may bring an action against him
therefor, and in such action there may be a judgment for treble
damages, forfeiture of the estate of the party offending, and
eviction from the premises.
This appears to be a carryover from the feudal Statute of
Gloucester, 49 enacted in 1278, which provided that a person guilty
of waste was liable for treble damages and that he forfeited the
place wasted. It has long since been repealed in England. '0  Why
do we keep it? Is there any compelling reason why the future
interests should gain more than they lost? The draftsmen of the
Uniform Property Act apparently thought compensatory damages
were sufficient.5" The writer agrees and advocates repeal of these
45. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1621 (1943): "'When the leasing of real property is term-
inated before the time originally agreed upon the lessee must pay the due proportion of the
lease for such use as he actually has made of the property unless such use is merely nominal
and of no benefit to him."
Id. § 47-1623: "Rent dependent on the life of a person may be recovered after as well
as before his death."
At common law, the lessee would not be liable for the rent where his term was cut
short prior to the due date of the rent. 1 Am. L. Prop. 135, n. 29 (1952).
46. At common law, rent is non-apportionable. The remainderman was entitled to
the whole amount at the subsequent due date, or the life tenant retained the whole amount,
if paid in advance, where the life estate terminated between due dates. Restatement, Prop-
erty § 120, comment c (1936).
47. See Restatement, Property § 120 (Supp. 1948), for a citation of statutes which so
provide.
48. N.D. Rev. Code § 32-1722 (1943). It is further provided: "Judgment of forfeiture
and eviction only shall be given in favor of the person entitled to the reversion against the
tenant in possession when the injury to the estate in reversion shall be adjudged in the
action to be equal to the value of the tenant's estate or unexpired term, or have been done
in malice." N.D. Rev. Code § 37-1723 (1943).
49. 6 Edw. I, c. 5.
50. Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 59.
51. 9a Uniform Laws Annotated 613 (1942): "When conduct claimed to constitute
waste is made the basis of a claim for damages, the claimant is not entitled to multiple
damages or to declare a forfeiture of the place wasted or of the interest of the defendant
in the place wasted except in accordance with covenants, agreements, or conditions binding
such defendants."
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provisions and substitution of section 21 of the Uniform Property
Act.-
Where a legal life estate is given in personal property, such
as stocks and bonds, the problem of preserving the remainderman's
interest becomes acute. Of course, if the trust device is used, the
trustee is capable of managing the property in the interest of both
the life beneficiary and the remainderman. But, where for some
reason the legal life estate is used, the facts that the property is
transportable, perhaps perishable, and subject to capital losses
(securities), makes the law of waste a doubtful safeguard of the
remainderman's interest.
While the life tenant can generally be required to give security
if it is shown that the property is in danger of loss, through misuse
or misappropriation,5 3 it is not otherwise clear to what extent a life
tenant or his personal representative must account for his tran-
sactions concerning the personal property.54
No Code provision or case in North Dakota is found relating
to the subject. It would seem however that it is a situation to
which trust principles should be applied, making the life-tenant
trustee or, if he does not desire to assume that responsibility,
allowing the courts to appoint a trustee. 5
It is believed therefore that a statute similar to that enacted
in Pennsylvania in 1947 should be adopted:"0
"A person having a present interest in personal property, or
in the proceeds of the conversion of real estate, which is not in
trust, and which is subject to a future interest, shall be deemed
to be a trustee of such property . .. with the ordinary powers
and duties of a trustee, except that he shall not be required
to change the form of the investment to an investment author-
ized for Pennsylvania fiduciaries, nor shall he be entitled to
compensation as a trustee. Such person, unless given a power
of consumption or excused from entering security by the terms
of the conveyance, shall be required to enter such security for
the protection of persons entitled to the future interest as the
court in its discretion shall direct. If a person having a present
interest shall not enter security as directed, the court shall ap-
point a trustee who shall enter such security as the court shall
direct, and who shall exercise all the ordinary powers and
duties of a trustee . .
52. Ibid.
53. See Notes, 14 A.L.R. 1066 (1921); 101 A.L.R. 271 (1936); 138 A.L.R. 440
(1942).
54. See Notes, 45 A.L.R. 519 (1926); 137 A.L.R. 1054 (1942).
55. Accord, 1 Am. L. Prop. 170-72 (1952).
56. Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, § 301.03.
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E. A Miscellaneous Problem
There is one problem of construction concerning life estates
that the writer feels should be anticipated and settled in this state
-that of implication of cross remainders in a deed conveying life-
estates to two or more persons as tenants in common. While the
rule appears settled as to conveyances by will, there is doubt as to
its application to conveyances by deed or will,5- although the
Restatement has stated the rule as equally applictable to convey-
ance by deed or will.38 Whether the transfer is by will or deed,
the intention of the conveyor would seem to be no different. The
answer is to adopt §17 of the Uniform Property Act if the act is
not adopted in toto. 9
DOWER, CURTESY, AND THE HOMESTEAD ESTATE
It is twice certain that the common law marital life estates,
dower and curtesy, do not exist in North Dakota-two distinct
sections say so '
The only statutory substitute therefor is the "homestead es-
tate.""l While homestead rights of the surviving spouse are rec-
ognized in nearly all states,5 2 they are particularly important in
North Dakota where no other provision is made for the surviving
spouse, other than by intestate succession.. 3  The entire estate of
either spouse may be disposed of by will, subject only to the home-
stead rights of the survivor."
If the homestead is not set off to the decedent before his death,
it can be selected after his death.- 5 It is an estate for the life of the
57. 1 Restatement, Property, Appendix, Monograph on Implication of Cross Remainders
in Deeds, Ap. 16 (1936).
58. Restatement, Property § 115, comment a (1936).
59. 9a Uniform Laws Annotated 255, § 17: "When an otherwise effective conveyance of
property is inade to two or more persons as tenants in common for life or for a term of
years which is terminable at their deaths, with an express remainder whether effective or
not, (a) to the survivor of such persons, or (b) upon the death of all the life tenants, to
another person or persons, such conveyance unless a different intent is effectively manifested
creates cross limitations among the several tenants in common, so that the share of the one
first dying passes to his cotenants to be held by them in the same manner as their original
shares, and the share of the second and others dying, in succession, are similarly treated until
the time when the property is limited to pass as a whole to the remainderman."
60. N.D. Rev. Code §§ 14-0709, 56-0102 (1943). See also Fore v. Fore's Estate,
2 N.D. 266, 50 N.W. 712 (1891).
61. N.D. Rev. Code c. 30-16 and c. 47-18 (1943).
62. 1 Am. L. Prop. 892 et seq. (1952).
63. N.D. Rev. Code c. 56-01 (1943). But the surviving spouse is entitled to an immediate
$2,500 "exemption" out of the probate estate. N.D. Laws 1953, c. 206. This is true even
though she is excluded by the will. Bender v. Bender, 64 N.D. 740, 256 N.W. 222 (1934).
And the court has discretion to make additional allowance from time to time for maintenance
during probate. N.D. Rev. Code § 30-1610 (1943). See Tyvand v. McDonnell, 37 N.D.
251, 164 N.W. 1 (1917).
64. Fore v. Fore's Estate, 2 N.D. 266, 50 N.W. 712 (1891).
65. N.D. Rev. Code § 30-1603 (1943).
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surviving spouse or until he or she remarries; if there is no surviving
spouse, or if the surviving spouse dies before all the children reach
majority, it goes to the children until the youngest reaches major-
ity.
66
The extent of the homestead is up to two acres of land if with-
in a town, not exceeding $25,000 in value;67 or up to 160 acres if not
within a town.68
In many cases this would hardly be more than a nominal pro-
vision for the surviving spouse who is cut off by will - what is a
home without an income to maintain it? Indeed it was originally
only intended as a protection to the surviving family from
creditors.69
It is felt that more adequate protection should be accorded
the surviving spouse in case she (or he, for that matter) be cut off
by will, though revival of technical dower and curtesy hardly seems
desirable. Considering the fact of fluctuating economic levels, a
provision in terms of so much value, as the homestead is presently
framed, would not seem to be desirable. And considering the fact
that much of the wealth of today is in personal property (e.g., stocks
and securities), provision in terms of land interest, too as the home-
stead is presently framed, seems outmoded. The possibility of a
percentage share of the decedent's estate at his death should be
studied, although that too has its drawbacks.o
66. Id. § 30-1602.
67. Id. § 47-1801 (1) as amended by N. D. Laws 1951, c. 277. This amendment,
raising the value from $8,000 to $25,000, may not have been effective to hold off creditors
if the value was over $8,000, for it did not change the provision in § 47-1804 which per-
mitted creditors to reach any value over $8,000. However, the oversight was remedied by
N.D. Laws 1953, c. 278, which amended § 47-1804 to also read $25,000.
N.D. Rev. Code § 30-1609 (1943), provides: "If the court finds that the homestead
selected . . . exceeds in value any limitation fixed by law and that the property cannot be
divided with material injury, the order setting it apart must determine the amount of such
excess and thereafter the property to the extent of the excess so determine the amount of such
after all of the other available property has been exhausted, to the payment of debts in the
same manner as other property." Doesn't this imply the "homestead estate" may exceed the
value limitation if the creditors don't protest? What if the heirs protest? The widow prevails.
Calmer v. Calmer, 15 N.D. 125, 106 N.W. 684 (1906). "If the homestead cannot be divided
without material injury, the family home must be preserved intact as against the heirs
whose right to inheritance is inferior in degree, and should be postponed to the right of the
decedent's family to their home, even though the homestead exceeds ... (the value limitation).
Creditors alone can demand that the homestead in such a case be subjected to their claims
to the extent that it exceeds the statutory limit of value."
68. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1801 (2) (1943).
69. See note 62, supra.
70. The problem is how to prevent the old goat from disposing of all his property
during his lifetime, leaving nothing for the widow's percentage share to operate upon. The
doctrine of "illusory transfers" has been invoked, but it is still a rough problem. In re
Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951); 50 Mich. L. Rev. 783 (1951).
ESTATES IN NORTH DAKOTA
THE ESTATE FOR YEARS
North Dakota has it, of course."' The writer has not attempted
to develop any problems in connection therewith, other than those
which also concern the life estate.
Concurrent Estates: Status of Tenancy by Entireties
What is the status of the tenancy by the entireties in North
Dakota? The pertinent statutory provision defining the possible
types of concurrent estates omits mention of estates by entireties.72
No North Dakota cases are found that have given any consideration
to this provision, and, so, none that have considered the specific
problem.
One writer has said that the married womens' legislation and
the omission of tenancy by the entireties from the statutory list of
types of cotenancies "abrogated" the tenancy by the entireties, but
simply cites the section with the list.73 However, it is believed
that the legal profession in North Dakota has also generally assumed
this conclusion.
74
The same writer cites In Re Lower's Estate,- in connection
with a similar conclusion for South Dakota, which has the same
statutory list of types of contenancies as North Dakota. But this
case simply recites the listing provision and speaks of joint ten-
ancies and tenancies in common. 76 It says nothing affirmatively or
negatively about tenancy by entireties.,
The Civil Code of 1865 provision from which the present North
71. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0402 (3) (1943). See N.D. Rev. Code c. 47-16 on the
leasing of real property.
72. Ibid. § 47-0205. "The ownership of property by several persons is either:
(1) of joint interests;
(2) of partnership interests; or
(3) of interests in common."
N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0206 (1943): "A joint interest is one owned by several persons
in equal shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the
will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as
joint tenants."
73. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temple L. Q. 24 (1951). This conclusion may
have some support by reason of the fact that, "In this state there is no common law in
any case where the law is declared by the code." N.D. Rev. Code § 1-0106 (1943). Further,
"the rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be construed strictly
has no application to this Code." N.D. Rev. Code § 1-0201 (1943).
74. Surprisingly enough, there is at the present time a reference in the Code to a tenancy
by the entireties. N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0203 (1943). However, the reference appears to be
entirely inadvertent, with no bearing on the status of that estate in North Dakota, inasmuch
as it was included in the Uniform Act on No Sufficient Evidence of Survivorship which was
enacted in 1943.
75. 48 S.D. 173, 203 N.W. 312 (1925).
76. "And there is nothing in the transfer of the property, conceding it was a transfer,
expressly declaring the same to be a joint tenancy, and in the absence of such an express
declaration in the transfer, conceding that she acquired title, it would only be an interest in
common with her husband in the certificate, and the right of survivorship could not exist."
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Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own
right, including husband and wife, is an interest in common, un-
less acquired by them in partnership, for partnership purposes,
or unless declared in its creation, expressly or by necessary
implication, to be a joint interest, with a right of survivorship."
[italics supplied].
Except for the italicized phrases, this provision is the same as
the last sentence of N. D. Rev. Code (1943), §47-0208. The
italicized parts were omitted from the Revised Codes of the Terri-
tory of Dakota, 1877. Is any significance to be attached to dropping
the phrase, "including husband and wife"? If so, what significance?
California, with similar provisions, has rejected the tenancy by
the entireties. 78  It is to be noted, however, that they did so at a
time when the list of concurrent estates included "community
interest of husband and wife,"' 79 and therefore, at a time when there
was no need for an estate by the entireties.
Is it not possible that the estate by the entireties could be
recognized as a form of joint tenancy, and thus within the listing?s°
It seems probable, however, that the married womens' property
legislations would be viewed as doing away with the unity of hus-
band and wife _ the technical theory on which the estate by
entireties was rested at common law. Yet, until the Supreme Court
of North Dakota has passed on the question, the only assumption
that can validly be made is that it is still an open question in this
state.
But consider the chief characteristics of the estate by entire-
ties: survivorship, nonseverability, and immunity from creditors.
Immunity from creditors of the separate spouses is the one to
which most objection has been made."3 And not without reason,
considering the unlimited possibilities of that immunity. But the
characteristic which prevents either spouse from voluntarily sever-
77. The Civil Code of the State of New York Reported Complete by the Commissioners
of the Code § 179 (1865).
78. Swan v. Walder, 156 Cal. 195, 103 Pac. 931 (1909).
79. Cal. Civil Code § 682 (Deering, 1949).
80. The Michigan Supreme Court has held with a somewhat similar statutory listing
of concurrent estates that the estate by the entireties, which was not expressly listed, is
included within their statute as a form of the listed joint tenancy. Hoyt v. Winstanley,
221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W. 213 (1922): "... an estate by the entirety is a species of
joint tenancy and included in that class."
81. N.D. Rev. Code § § 14-0704, 14-0705, 14-0708 (1943).
82. So holding, under similar statutes, Helvie v. Hoover, 11 Okla. 687, 69 Pac. 958
(1902). But note, however, that Oklahoma subsequently reinstated the tenancy by entireties
by legislation. Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 60, § 74.
83. McDougal and Haber, Property, Wealth, Land 417-19 (1948).
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ing the estate, which is not true of a simple joint tenancy, might
well serve a useful purpose, in conjunction with the right of sur-
vivorship, in a state where a surviving spouse is not accorded dower
or curtesy, and is given only a very limited protection, in the form
of "homesteads."
84
Therefore, the writer suggests that the tenancy by entireties
be added to the list of enumerated estates, s 5 and that the following
provision be enacted:" 6
"A tenancy by the entireties is an interest owned by husband
and wife by a title created by a single will or transfer when
expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a tenancy by the
entireties. Such estate may not be voluntarily severed by either
spouse, but the interest of either spouse, is subject to severance
pursuant to execution, levy and sale by a judgment creditor."
CONCLUSION
What the writer characterized, at the beginning of this paper,
as "our machinery of estates" seems to be functioning pretty well.
But a few repairs do seem necessary!
84. See text to notes 61-70, supra.
85. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0205 (1943). To complete the picture, N.D. Rev. Code
§ 47-0208 (1943), should also be amended to read thus: "Every interest created in favor
of several persons in their own right is an interest in common, unless acquired by them
in partnership purposes, or unless declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy or tenancy
by the entireties."
86. Compare Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit., 60, J 74.
